We still don’t know exactly what prompted the actions Beijing took in 2020, or why it made the deal at this time. We know that he/she has tried to stabilize the deteriorating relations with Australia and the US over the last few years. Analysts have speculated that they and the current efforts by India stem from the strategic and economic pressures faced by China. This has potential domestic consequences for governance. At the same time there is uncertainty about the outlook of the next US President.
How many countries have the power to talk to Zelensky-Putin… Jaishankar told how India’s power is visible in the world
Its interactions with India, Australia and several European countries also reflect its old strategy of creating rifts between partners in balancing alliances. India did not take as much time as it took China to reach this point. It has strengthened its deterrence capabilities and partnerships. Even though there is still a lot to be done. Furthermore, the border situation has changed with the strengthening of troops, weapons and infrastructure. In part, this is because there is little confidence that the agreements will restrain China. China has come to be considered as a challenge, if not a threat to India.Germany is praising India a lot, what is the reason?
India has viewed China as an obstacle to achieving Indian objectives. That relationship was supposed to be a source of stability, but has now become a source of insecurity. Economic ties were considered an opportunity, but are now considered a weakness. From helping India find its rightful place on the global platform, today China is considered India’s main rival in the Global South and even in BRICS. By helping to enhance India’s strategic autonomy – by becoming a partnership option – Beijing is seen today as a significant deterrent to India.Consensus reached on patrolling and use of pastureland in some areas on LAC, big statement by Rajnath Singh
At the same time, India’s partnerships with like-minded countries have broadened and deepened unprecedentedly in the last decade since the 2014 border standoff, and especially since 2020. For example, shared concerns about China’s assertiveness have not only advanced India-US cooperation in defence, technology, economic security and even multilateral areas, but also encouraged them to manage differences. It is surprising that even during sensitive talks with Beijing, Delhi has left no stone unturned in taking several steps with its partners – as it could have done before 2020.
China avoided even mentioning the ‘agreement’ on LAC, only talked about ‘significant progress’, there is a flaw in the dragon’s heart!
These include PM Modi’s reply to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te and inauguration of Taiwan’s third representative office in India; This includes India welcoming the US Congressional delegation to meet the Dalai Lama. Also attending the Quad summit and signing strict language on China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, hosting the Malabar and Tarang Shakti exercises; and Australia’s participation in maritime reconnaissance cooperation activity with its Quad partners during Exercise Kakadu. Perhaps India has gone from seeing deepening ties with the US and other partners as an obstacle to negotiations with China to believing that they are an enabler, bringing Beijing to the table.
The ice in relations is melting, India and China are coming closer again, Russia is also behind this friendship.
India’s partners, such as the US, will not be surprised by the recent agreement. It has been clear for months that talks between Delhi and Beijing were serious. Washington will consider this a notable step to reduce tensions, but given Beijing’s track record, it will also wait to see if it actually works. The US itself has worked to ground its relations with China, but like Delhi, it has seen no change in the fundamentals. There is an understanding of the special pressures India faces as its continental neighbor to China.
It will take time to restore trust with China… What did the Army Chief say on the LAC agreement with Dragon?
However, the US and other partners will be wondering how the new agreements might affect India’s willingness to cooperate with them. This is no different from India’s concerns about the implications of the US or Australia’s interactions with China. And just as they should keep India informed about those negotiations, India should do the same to keep its balancing partners on board.
(Tanvi Madan is the author of ‘Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War’.)
