Pir Panjal mistake in 1965 war and Pakistan got free pass for infiltration, Rajnath felt uneasy

New Delhi: India got a big opportunity in 1965, but it could not be capitalized and had to pay a heavy price for it. This tension can be clearly felt in the statements of Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. he/she said that if the Indian government had converted the ‘strategic advance’ of troops into a ‘strategic advantage’ at the negotiating table after the India-Pakistan war of 1965, the problem of cross-border infiltration would have been solved. he/she said the Indian Army had succeeded in hoisting the tricolor on Haji Pir in 1965, and ‘if it had not been returned to the negotiating table, the infiltration routes of terrorists could have been closed.’ However, he/she further said, ‘This is not an allegation. Whatever happened, there must be some thinking behind it, and I don’t want to discuss it here. The Defense Minister said these things at a function of Armed Forces Veterans Day in Akhnoor, Jammu on January 14. Let us understand why the India-Pakistan war of 1965 was fought, what happened after that and what is the importance of Haji Pir in stopping infiltration?

Infiltration problem in Jammu and Kashmir

India has a 740-km long Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, which passes through the union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. The Indian Army has installed barbed wire fencing along the 540-km LoC in Jammu and Kashmir to prevent infiltration of terrorists and smuggling of arms, ammunition and narcotics. It is closely monitored by Indian soldiers 24×7. Despite this, terrorists sometimes find a way to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir and smuggle weapons and narcotics. Drains and dense forests on dangerous hilly terrain act as natural gaps along the LOC. Defense experts say that this infiltration becomes easier through Haji Pir Pass on the Pakistan occupied Kashmir side. Haji Pir is a mountain pass situated at an altitude of 8,661 feet on the western end of the Pir Panjal mountain range. Its capture gives Pakistan a strategic geographical advantage.

operation gibraltar

Pakistani soldiers, disguised as locals, infiltrated into Kashmir in August 1965, with Haji Pir Pass being one of their major routes. The plan was to instigate the Muslim majority population of Kashmir against the Indian government. Pakistan believed that the rebellion of the local population would help its Kashmir cause in international forums. Its military strategy was that on the one hand, a number of troops would occupy key heights around the Kashmir Valley, while on the other hand, in collaboration with other local populations, they would destroy bridges, highways, communication and logistics establishments of the Indian Army, thus allowing it to invade India. It will look like a local rebellion against the government.

However, the operation failed early on as the local Kashmiris did not revolt and instead informed the army and police about the presence of Pakistani infiltrators. As a result, more troops were sent into the valley, capturing or killing most of the infiltrators. After the end of the 1965 war with Pakistan, the government honored many local people for their help. Mohammad Din, a youth from Darkasi village of Tangmarg, had taken his/her animals to Tosha ground where he/she encountered Pakistani infiltrators.

As he/she won the trust of the Pakistanis, he/she asked Deen to buy some things, including pheran (local Kashmiri dress). However, Mohammad Din informed the army. After the war, Deen was awarded the Padma Shri for his/her contributions. However, he/she was killed by terrorists in the early days of the insurgency in 1990. Ghulam Din, a sarpanch of the border village Dalan, helped the Indian soldiers reach Haji Pir by avoiding the Pakistani soldiers stationed there. he/she was also awarded the highest peacetime gallantry award, Ashok Chakra.

India-Pakistan war of 1965

Indian troops crossed the Line of Control on 15 August and captured three important hill positions in the Kargil sector opposite the Srinagar-Leh National Highway. By 28 August, the Indian Army had captured the entire Haji Pir Bulge and Haji Pir Pass, about 8 km inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). The capture of Haji Pir was a major strategic victory for India, as it not only neutralized logistics and closed infiltration routes, but also took control of the Poonch-Uri road, allowing access to these two border towns. The distance between them reduced from 282 km to 56 km.

But after the failure of Operation Gibraltar, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Grand Slam, in which soldiers of its division attacked Akhnoor in the early hours of September 1, 1965. Their plan was to capture the then only bridge over the Chenab at Akhnoor, which would have blocked Indian supplies to their troops stationed south of Pir Panjal. From Akhnoor, Pakistani troops planned to advance towards Jammu and cut off the national highway to Kashmir.

In the initial advance, he/she captured Chhamb (Chhamb). Due to American assistance, the Pakistani Army had superior artillery, armour, and infantry strength. However, as they continued their attack on Akhnoor, the Indian Army took the battle directly inside Pakistan. The Indian Army opened a new front in Pakistan’s Punjab province and marched to Sialkot, approaching Lahore. Due to this, Pakistan had to withdraw its troops from Kashmir to protect Lahore.

Tashkent Declaration

The ceasefire on 20 September ended 17 days of hostilities between the two countries. This was followed by the signing of the Tashkent Declaration on January 10, 1966, in which both sides agreed to return to their previous status quo. At that time, 1,920 square km of Pakistan’s territory belonged to India, consisting mainly of the fertile lands of Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir regions, including the strategic Haji Pir Pass. Pakistan had 550 km² of Indian territory, mainly in the desert opposite its Sindh province, and Chhamb in Akhnoor.

The 1965 war resulted in a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan as it did not succeed in igniting an insurgency in Kashmir, instead it was forced to transfer its troops to defend Lahore. During the Tashkent Declaration India also returned Haji Pir and other occupied areas to Pakistan. With the withdrawal of Haji Pir, Pakistan regained strategic advantage along the LOC in Jammu. Pakistan vacated Chhamb, but India again lost the area in the 1971 war. It is now part of PoK.