The recent history of counter-terrorism and anti-infiltration operations in Jammu and Kashmir shows that despite political turmoil in Pakistan, the terrorist network continues to spread. These networks constantly look for ‘easy places’ south of Pir Panjal when their operations in North Kashmir feel pressured. That is, when pressure increases in the north, the terrorist network starts looking for ground in the south. The current spate of terror encounters in the Doda region is reminiscent of 2003, when General NC Vij was the Army Chief and the Northern Command led by Lieutenant General Rostam Nanavati launched Operation Sarp Vinash to clear the terror-affected hilly areas of Hilkaka around the town of Surankote in Poonch region.
Modus operandi
The area is densely forested on the southern and south-eastern slopes of the Pir Panjal. Ridgeline in the west. The area is bounded by the Suran river in the south. The area is rugged with innumerable peaks, spurs and rivulets. In summers, it is home to a migratory population of Bakarwals and Gujjars from nearby villages and beyond who come to graze their livestock in the area. The area is dotted with temporary shelters – Dhoks and Bahiks. In winters, the area was completely empty of locals. The area became a haven for terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir. Lashkar, Jaish and Al-Badr terrorists felt so at ease in the area that they even played cricket with the locals. For nearly 3 years, the Surankot area remained a haven for terrorists south of Pir Panjal. It was then that the Romeo Force of the National Rifles was tasked to make a final attempt to ‘clear, secure and control’ the area of Hilkaka, north of Surankote in early 2003.
Cleaning the Hilkaka
At the end of Operation Parakram in October 2002, Nanavati decided that an operation was necessary to secure Surankot and Hilkaka. This could be carried out only after the winter of 2002-03.
One reference was that citizens migrating to that area with their animals for the entire season in summer had to be stopped. The then CM considered the proposal absurd, but an offer was put before him/her that no operation would take place until there was agreement.
Plan for Operation Sarp Vinash
The task was assigned to 16 Corps, who in turn handed it over to the Counter Insurgency Force (Romeo) under the command of Major General (later Lieutenant General) HS Lidder. Lidder had served as CO 9 Para (CDO) in Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka. Also, he/she knew the terrain and terrorist activity in the Rajouri-Mendhar-Poonch sector well. In the initial briefing of the operation, it became clear to Nanavati that the task was beyond the capabilities of RR units in general and the RR Sector in particular, both because of their existing operational commitments and the nature of the task. Therefore, Nanavati directed that 163 Infantry Brigade of 16 Corps be allotted to CIF (R) to ‘clear and secure’ the area. The date fixed was May 1, 2003.
Lidder began his/her work in a systematic manner. Helipads were constructed with the help of the Indian Air Force. Operational tracks were built for supply points. On-the-job training was ensured for the allotted infantry formations. Intelligence was collected by a team of 9 Para (CDO), which was operating in the area and achieved several successes.
The plan was simple. Infantry units using Para (CDO) guides would infiltrate into their designated areas under the cover of darkness from three different directions, secure and occupy the hideouts, and then launch search and destroy operations in their designated areas of responsibility. Lidder also made arrangements to deal with terrorists trying to escape across the Pir Panjal into the Kashmir Valley region. For this, Headquarters 15 Corps was also kept in constant touch.
decisive results
Lidder recalls that the operation was launched a week earlier and completed on May 1, 2003. Replying to a question in Parliament, then Defence Minister George Fernandes revealed the truth, saying, “In Operation Sarp Vinash, troops were sent in by the NC in the last week of March 2003, and the operation in Hilkaka was launched on April 21, 2003.”
During the operation, 65 terrorists were killed and three were arrested. 119 hideouts were busted and 79 major weapons and a large quantity of war material were recovered. During the operation, 5 army personnel made the supreme sacrifice and 5 were injured.
Twenty years later, though the magnitude of infiltration and the number of terrorists in the region may not be the same, the defence establishment cannot afford to relax its vigil in the battle field. With terrorist activities on the rise in the Jammu region, the need of the hour is to conduct operations like those in 2003. It is important to ensure that a desperate Pakistan is not able to derail peace in Jammu and Kashmir.
(The author is a military historian and strategic expert.)
