Opinion: Why does the Modi government need to learn from Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s era?

Author: R.Jagannathan
It is not uncommon for coalition governments to roll back, alter or make tricky compromises on policies to stay in power. Even with this condition, NDA 3.0 looks less secure than the Vajpayee and UPA era coalitions, even though the largest coalition party has a significantly higher number of seats. The BJP’s 240 seats today does not put the government on more solid ground than Vajpayee’s 182 seats in 1999. Within just two and a half months of its third term, the Modi government has had to reverse or amend several decisions. It started with withdrawing the budget proposal this year not to provide indexation benefits for sale of properties purchased before Budget Day on July 23, 2024. One might consider this normal, as the finance minister reacts to market feedback. But then we got the Waqf Act amendment. Again, one might argue that it is parliamentary practice to form multi-party panels to scrutinise important bills. But this approach was not adopted in the previous two terms.

Recently, a caste-based minor party like the LJP, which has only five MPs, forced the withdrawal of a UPSC advertisement that called for lateral entry into the government. And more recently, the government announced a new Unified Pension Scheme (UPS) for government employees. It has many features of the old pension scheme (OPS), offering defined benefits as opposed to the defined contribution approach or contribution-based approach of the National Pension System (NPS). One could argue that the decision to “reform” the NPS was already underway in the previous term of the Modi government, given the pressure to opt for the OPS from non-BJP governments. But would one say the same if other established policies were under review due to increasing political pressures? For example, would one say that it is perfectly fine for the government to provide a legal guarantee for MSP, if it seems politically inevitable?

The government, of course, needs the support of its coalition partners. It cannot always stand firm on important policy decisions. So being overly critical of the government is a bit too harsh. But it seems that this government is yet to come to terms with ‘coalition dharma’. Compromises and rollbacks may be considered necessary in a multi-party coalition, but it seems that the government is not consulting its allies enough before announcing changes or introducing new legislation.

The key feature of ‘coalition dharma’ is not that there will be complex compromises, but how these compromises are made. Consultation beforehand could have saved the government from some of the embarrassing U-turns it has had to make since coming to office.

There is a crucial difference between the Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Modi coalitions of 1999, 2004 and 2024: both former prime ministers entered coalitions knowing they would have to compromise. But Modi, who has ruled a state for nearly 13 years and the Centre for 10 years, has never been in a position to bargain with allies. This means the current coalition government started out without a solid understanding of how allies should be involved in decision-making.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his/her Cabinet in June, he/she tried to project continuity rather than change, with almost all top Cabinet ministers being the same old faces, barring Shivraj Singh Chouhan as Agriculture Minister. Allies got some key ministries like aviation, panchayati raj, heavy industries and food processing, but any group photo of the Union Cabinet taken before the elections will not look much different from one taken after.

The BJP also pretended that nothing had changed after June 4. With Modi back and leading a new government, there was no official acknowledgement of the major underground shift that had taken place in Indian politics.

It would be unfair to be overly critical of a new government that is learning the ropes of coalition management after two terms of not worrying about allies. Coalitions are not born by swearing on ‘coalition dharma’. This dharma is learned on the job, and it has no choice but to make adjustments in its political approach by learning from its recent mistakes.

Vajpayee was not a born coalition leader, nor was Sonia Gandhi. However, Sonia Gandhi had Manmohan Singh as a buffer to take the blame for any mistakes. During Vajpayee’s tenure as prime minister, finance minister Yashwant Sinha earned the title of ‘rollback Sinha’ for good reason. Crucial decisions like deregulating oil prices and privatisation had to be put on hold before the 2004 elections. During Manmohan’s tenure, P Chidambaram could not list Bharat Sanchar Nigam due to pressure from the communists. And multi-brand retail had to be opened up, much to Mamata Banerjee’s anger.

For Modi, the transition from being the undisputed boss of a majority party to captaining a coalition should actually be easier than for Vajpayee and Manmohan or Sonia. The reason is that he/she has a stronger political base than Vajpayee and Sonia.

If the government prepares its allies in advance, and explains its policies to activists and allies in more detail, they are more likely to accept the logic of reforms. In short, if the government accepts the need for more discussion with allies and colleagues before making important decisions, Modi is more likely to succeed as prime minister than his/her two predecessors. he/she cannot leave this task to lightweight ministers.

Modi needs a stable coalition to transform himself from an undisputed leader into someone allies trust, and are willing to stand by him/her when there is a threat to the government’s survival.

(The author is a senior journalist and editorial director of Swarajya)